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INTRODUCTION 
 
“You need jugad in this world to get rich … and the only way one can get rich fast is to 
get into politics” (Rakesh, twenty-six years old, aspiring leader or chamcha, western 
Uttar Pradesh, North India). 
 
“A good politician is the one who can think fast and make things happen faster” (migrant 
laborer, twenty-three years old, Sylhet, Bangladesh). 
 
This article explores “the art of making do” (jugaad) and the game of democracy across 
North India and Bangladesh. It does so by investigating the performances of a particular category 
of “jugaadis” (improvisers) sometimes derogatively referred to as “lanjoo panjoo” (leader in the 
making) or “chamchas” (sycophants) in their local areas.1 The exploration of their career 
trajectories not only constitutes a fruitful field for anthropologically studying how the democratic 
game is used to stage a better life, but also sheds light on the working of systems of (criminal) 
democratic power—locally known by such vernacular terms as “Goonda Raj” or “Mafia Raj” in 
North India, and “Manstanocracy” in Bangladesh, that is, mafia or criminal rule.2 These are 
hybrid systems of governance where criminal organizations, politicians, police, and bureaucrats 
are entangled in a relationship of collusion and divestment, sharing control over spaces and 
population (cf. Jaffe 2013). This article shows how six young men attempt to enter such 
structured, economic and political, muscular systems of governance. Central to their career path 
is the ability to master how to enforce.  
In a seminal book, van Schendel and Abraham (2005) discuss the thresholds between 
large-scale organized crime, micro-level organized crime, and informal economy. It should be 
noted that these complex “worlds in between” have not been explored and theorized in the 
context of South Asia. In the region, historians and social anthropologists have commonly 
focused on informality and/or on studying colonial notions of “thuggery,” “the dacoit,” and “the 
criminal tribe or caste.” The latter widely explore the conditions under which a distinctly modern 
notion of crime took shape in colonial South Asia.3 Yet, the thresholds between criminal politics, 
organized crime, and gangs have not received equal scrutiny (Sen 2007). Our ethnographic 
exploration focuses on these ‘contact zones’ and responds to recent calls for an anthropology of 
modern statehood (Das and Poole 2004; Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Spencer 2007) in its 
relationship to violence, corruption, and crime (Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues 2010; Comaroff 
and Comaroff 2016; Parnell and Kane 2003; Schneider and Schneider 2008). We are also in 
dialogue with classical South Asian debates on patronage, caste, and ethnic politics (Chandra 
2004; Jaffrelot 2002). A great deal of work on clientelism and patronage in South Asia tends to 
overemphasize how leaders mediate or distribute resources rather than their role as violent 
protectors and enforcers (see, e.g., Piviliasky 2014). In a similar vein, South Asian “patronage 
democracies” (Chandra 2004) have been conceived as democracies in which elected political 
leaders have the power to distribute the vast resources controlled by the state to vote on an 
individual basis. In a “Mafia Raj,” however, what is crucial is not redistribution but criminal 
partnerships between the state and private capitalism based on the power of enforcement by force 
and intimidation. And it is precisely the role of enforcement that we wish to explore in the 
following discussion and with it the thresholds between the informal economy and organized 
crime—between “jugaad” and  violent political entrepreneurship. 
 
“THE ART OF MAKING DO” AND POLITICS 
India and Bangladesh offer a particularly useful comparative context for understanding 
such micro power dynamics. Since 1947, the political environments of the two countries, which 
share a great deal of historical, cultural, and political continuity, have diverged. The emergence 
of democracy in India, “authoritarianism” in Pakistan, and what has been termed 
“confrontational democracy” in Bangladesh has produced at times distinctive political 
trajectories, patterns of political participation, styles of leadership, and conceptions of justice 
(Jalal 1995). However, by contrasting ethnographies of jugad and democratically elected 
systems of “Mafia Raj,” our study highlights fascinating parallels in the ways criminal 
entrepreneurship and violence intertwine with statehood today in the region and beyond it. 
Indeed, scholarly works on South Asia tend to be generally “India-centered” or focus on specific 
in-country issues. The result is that common “South Asian” practices and the effects of more 
globalized trends often remain unexamined and untheorized (cf. Harper and Amrith 2012). 
Thinking broadly and cross-culturally about the nature of (criminal) power and politics allows us 
to challenge essentializations of “Indian” or “Bangladeshi” ideas and practices of power as 
rooted, for example, in established Hindu or Muslim sociocultural registers of power and 
authority. Importantly it helps to us to identify a set of situations and interlocked logics of profit, 
power, and personal sovereignties that are highly comparable with other places where crime and 
politics have over time been thoroughly intertwined: for example, Italy, Russia, the Philippines, 
Mexico, Japan, and the United States.4 
 
*** 
What are the parallels? For a start, in both our settings in western Uttar Pradesh and 
Sylhet “the art of making do” is often referred to with the same term, jugaad, which means to 
improvise, to be resourceful and entrepreneurial. It can also refer to various sorts of improvised 
machines and makeshift structures, quick-fix solutions, or workarounds. However, broadly the 
term implies that one is devising strategies that are not “on books, intended to address practical 
problems and cope, with a lack of resources, burdensome rules and regulations, inadequate 
infrastructure and unreliable services” (Chattaraj 2018). Jeffrey, Jeffery, and Jeffery (2008, 5) 
have shown how young, unemployed males (jugaadis) live in a highly competitive world in 
which source, force, and the need to improvise become paramount concerns. In short, jugaad is 
often conceived as a resourceful way of getting by, as a virtuous practice. By the same token, it 
is also viewed as a corrupted and criminal practice (cf. Jauregui 2014). Across South Asia, there 
is a wealth of literature on fixers, brokers, and their vernacular cultures of entrepreneurship, 
some of which are also linked in interesting ways to “neoliberal discourses.” In the 2000s, the 
Indian government also began to use the term jugaad as a means of advertising a type of 
homegrown spirit of ingenuity in India. What remains systematically kept in the background is 
that these often glorified, “neoliberal,” informal jobs require enforcement and participation in 
organized “power syndicates” and “groups” in order to operate. Jugaadis often brush with crime 
and in order to succeed they need to become enforcers (dabang, mastan). 
It should be noted that the art of making do and its capacity to legitimize (or reject) 
corruption and criminality is certainly not specific to South Asia. Similar “arts” have been 
documented at length in South Italy (Pardo 1996; Pine 2012), to tease out the relation between 
organized forms of crime (like Camorra in Naples), or in the context of Africa, to analyze the 
figure of the trickster (Bayart et al. 1999; Simone 2004). Comparatively, however, one of the 
peculiar features of the landscape of ideas and practices in “the art of making do” in North India 
and Bangladesh is the use of politics as a system for upward mobility and the acquisition of 
personal power and wealth across all social classes and the caste or communities spectrum. This 
is what people refer to as “political” jugaad. This article focuses on political “jugaadis” and on 
the jugaad that emerging leaders need to master in order to start and establish a career in the 
Uttar Pradesh “Mafia Raj” and the Sylhet “Mastanocracy.” 
 South Asia is quite well known for its high levels of voter turnout. What is less known is 
that citizens in both India and Bangladesh also contest elections in extraordinarily large numbers. 
The market of politics provides economic and symbolic resources that are creatively used to 
expand personal assets and renegotiate individual and communities’ lives (Michelutti 2008, 
chap. 7). It has been suggested that democracy has survived and flourished in India because it 
was quickly seen to be one of the most effective systems to achieve “personal sovereignty” (cf. 
Varma 2004, 7). Similarly, in Bangladesh, the revolution of 1971 created a socioeconomic power 
vacuum caused by the demise of the old political elite, which, in turn, was appropriated by newly 
urbanized, aspirational working and lower middle classes (Van Schendel 2009, 251–52) who 
engage with the market of politics to convert new money into status and power (and more 
money). Thus, not surprisingly, our fieldworks produced a common substantial finding. In both 
settings, the figure of the strongman politician is a glamorous and coveted one. This is true not 
only for working-class and poor, unemployed youth who aspire to become self-made criminal-
strongman-fixers and politicians but also for wealthy men and women and established middle-
age businessmen or mafia-dons who aspire to be voted as MLAs or MPs.5 
*** 
The assertions and hyper politicization of our informants’ lives and the role of democracy 
in shaping the local manifestations of arts of making do make sense when one explores the 
“palimpsest of sovereignties” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 9) that features in South Asian 
political landscapes. In postcolonial South Asia, “authority” is hyper fragmented (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2005). The legacy of a segmented society reflects itself in processes of 
“vernacularisation of democracy” (Michelutti 2008) that are producing ad hoc ideas and 
practices of democracy across communities and castes (see also Witsoe 2009). In this socially 
and politically segmented environment, competing leaders often present themselves as having 
the capacity “to get things done” for their castes, clans, brotherhoods, and village communities in 
ways that sidestep the law (Michelutti 2010, 46). It follows that localized “Mafia Raj” regimes 
are often presided over by self-made men (and seldom women) who attempt to achieve 
monopolistic control over an area’s coercive and economic resources. It is in this context that 
everybody wants to (and in theory can) become a “raja” (king or monarch). As Brijesh Yadav 
(successful local neighborhood strongman, forty-two years old, western Uttar Pradesh) puts it: 
“Today muscle is power. Earlier, only the son of the king could rule. Today everybody can rule. 
You need weapons to rule. Leaders need to have guns. Not everybody should have guns—only 
people with status. However, nowadays everyone who wishes can get guns and rule.” The stories 
of our six young men show that while on the one hand everybody wants to (and in theory can) 
become a strongman or raja, this is often untenable in practice. “The art of making do” is indeed 
not less structured than any other social phenomena. The next section sketches the backgrounds 
against which the jugaadis  of this article perform “the art of making do”  in an attempt to 
become political bosses with personal power and economic wealth. 
 
BACKGROUND: WESTERN UTTAR PRADESH AND SYLHET AND THEIR CRIMINAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMIES 
Systems of “Mafia Raj” develop where there is wealth and where the state is too 
compromised to regulate the conflicts and opportunities that arise from such wealth. This is 
clearly shown in the comparative material on Russia, Italy, East Asia, and Africa (for a summary 
of this literature, see Volkov 2002). The provincial town in western Uttar Pradesh where 
fieldwork was conducted has undergone tremendous economic changes over the past two 
decades. The area is witnessing a construction boom and skyrocketing real estate prices as a 
result of quicker access to Delhi thanks to the construction of the Yamuna Expressway, and to its 
proximity to the industrial and residential hubs of Noida and Faridabad. Here a predatory and 
criminalized economy finances political parties and the political careers of gangsters (Martin and 
Michelutti 2017; Vaishnav 2017). In the district, multi-party competition correlates with higher 
levels of communal and caste-based conflict (Wilkinson 2004), and a higher number of criminal 
political candidates. Democratic competition, as Wilkinson has argued, produced a heightened 
scramble for monetary and political resources and turned money and muscle-power into 
prerequisites for electoral success. 
In Sylhet—the Bangladesh province where the overwhelming majority of British-
Bangladeshis originate—fieldwork was conducted in a village and district with a prosperous 
remittance economy. Here, during the fifteen years of democracy leading up to the quasi-military 
coup in January 2007, it was the confrontational nature of political competition (particularly 
between the two main political parties) and economic liberalization that created a widespread need 
for extra-legal economic and muscle resources. Both our case studies show how systems of “Mafia 
Raj” encapsulate the hybridization of state and crime (Bayart et al. 1999). Expanding systems of 
“Mafia Raj,” as Harriss-White (2003, 7) shows in the context of South Asia, “increasingly serves 
private accumulation: a nexus in which politicians, officials, criminals, and businessmen and 
their (often poor and dependent) “runners” and fixers are bound together in a mutually protective 
embrace.” Enforcement with impunity and trading or imposing protection is the central trope of 
such il/legal political economies (see Martin and Michelutti 2017; Michelutti et al., 
forthcoming). Thus these systems take “the art of making do” to a whole new level, and one not 
considered in any detail in the literature on entrepreneurs in South Asia, but widely explored in 
the work on violent cultures of entrepreneurship in other settings. This is jugad but on a different 
scale, in a different sphere, and with different consequences, often as serious as life or death. Let 
us explain. 
It is widely documented that leaders in South Asia (together with fixers and political 
brokers) spend a great deal of time resolving problems for their supporters and mediate between 
them and the state (Berenschot 2011; Birtchnell 2011; Manor 2000;  Reddy and Haragopal 1985) 
and in ensuring the delivery of services (Anand 2015). However, this literature does not 
completely shed light on the many instances in which people approach leaders not in pursuit of a 
license, or a birth certificate, or an electricity connection, but to use their powers to keep those 
bureaucrats, fixers, and other politicians who demand too much money for their (illicit) 
services—or who do not deliver after being paid—in place. 
For example, in western Uttar Pradesh, one of the most common requests one hears at 
darbars is to keep in check police personnel who overcharge for fraudulent First Information 
Report entries or the annulment of cases.6 Another common request in both western Uttar 
Pradesh and Sylhet is for assistance in getting people out of prison or to keep them out of prison. 
It follows that money, threats, and intimidation need to be at hand to put pressure on people to 
get things done, from everyday bureaucratic procedures, such as registering land, issuing birth 
certificates, or settling disputes, to assistance with the police, and even getting out of jail. 
Crucially, the services “getting done” are often clearly illegal. Citizens need to continuously 
break or bend the law (do jugaad) to get along with life. Similar to the ways mafia networks in 
other parts of the world operate (Gambetta 1993; Sidel 2004; Volkov 2002), powerful leaders 
protect people involved in both legal and illegal activities; a practice interchangeably referred to 
as “sewa” (social work) or “goondagardi” (criminal work). Any efficient and authoritative boss, 
therefore, must be able to demonstrate aptitude in these “enforcing” or “protection” tasks. On the 
whole, this material shifts the attention from individual political mediation, the capacity to access 
to state resources, and the provision of alternative resources (Berenschot 2011) to the capacity 
(real or perceived) to enforce orders “to get things done” with impunity. But how does one 
acquire such capacity?  
 
THE POWER OF MONEY AND FORCE 
In the context of Bangladesh (but increasingly so in North India), one must get rich. 
Money is what increasingly provides enforcement power. Bangladeshis, particularly in rural 
Sylhet, do not trust poor leaders. If a politician is rich, it means he possesses “power” (komota, 
shakti, taqat). He or she is aware of how to make money (often from criminal entrepreneurship), 
how to spend it, and, most importantly, how to keep it. Money, in Bangladesh, equates to 
enforcement and a web of influential and efficacious contacts that, in turn, buy impunity.  
Similarly, in India, as one MLA in western Uttar Pradesh explained: “people expect politicians to 
be not modest but to show off their wealth and power—otherwise you do not get respect.” 
Next, the aspirant boss (elected or not elected) is expected to be wily (chalak, hoshyar, 
buddi-maan). He or she needs to have scheming skills. In a competitive world, he or she needs to 
possess the appropriate guile and acumen to protect and enforce his or her followers’ interests. In 
both studied settings, to belong to a political family, formal education, and “being smart” may be 
demonstrative of these attributes, but not always. In Bangladesh, it is crucial that a leader is able 
to speak well in public (shundor maat-kota). Stammering, hesitating, or a lack of passion in a 
public forum will undoubtedly provoke a delegitimizing and potentially career-ending backlash 
in the form of ridicule and repulsion (Ruud 2001). In Western Uttar Pradesh, “speaking well” is a 
plus but, by the same token, not being a good orator and not being educated does not prevent 
many violent entrepreneurs from translating their enforcement skills into formal positions of 
power. Similarly, in Bangladesh, speaking well in public does not work if one lacks the nous or 
single-mindedness to push an agenda in an aggressive environment. 
In this regard, a direct background in “enforcement” and involvement in broader criminal 
networks is good for the resume. Alternatively, close collaboration with reputable goons and 
mafia-dons is essential. A mastaan or dabang is conditioned by the mores of the “street”; he or 
she is aware of his or her detractors and even more aware of how to push them out of the way. In 
places like western Uttar Pradesh, where security is increasingly available only when your own 
leader is in power, “democratic rajas” (Michelutti 2014a) must not only be generous benefactors 
and speak well, but also protect their “people”—defending and punishing—as the need may 
arise. This thinking finds expression in the widespread idioms of fearlessness and virility that 
surround political life and the popular imagery that advertises politicians’ “heroic” (bahadur) 
capacity to protect. So, violent protectors need to win their supporters using violence, not only to 
threaten and subordinate them (although they use it for those purposes too), but also as a form of 
guarantee of their capacity to rule—something their supporters increasingly demand. Thus 
supporters not only expect that their representatives will help them get jobs and access to health 
provisions, resolve their disputes, arrange marriages, and so on, but they also want to be assured 
that their leaders have “safeguards” in place that guarantee that their promises will materialize. 
They want enforcing representatives. 
 
CASTE AND COMMUNITY BACKGROUND 
It should be emphasized that, in the context of Uttar Pradesh, most of the qualities 
described above work more efficiently if one is a member of the right caste or community. This 
means to belong to one of the local dominant and/or numerically strong castes. In this region 
bosses’ capacity to dominate particular territories is often linked to caste and community forms 
of territorial governance. “Territorial” forms of democracy, as Witsoe (2009) conceptualized, go 
hand to hand with contemporary Mafia-esque bosses in western Uttar Pradesh. As Bangladesh is 
a Muslim-majority country, large-scale caste mobilization is much less pronounced than in 
neighboring India. Having said this, some prominent caste groups exercise significant influence 
in democratic processes (fishing castes, for example). Nevertheless, caste politics remains 
subsidiary to the interests of class groups, such as peasants (krishok) and workers (sromik), that 
are highly unionized and consolidated within the Bangladeshi political landscape. On the other 
end of the scale, traditional landowning groups (zamindar, talukdar), and members of the 
colonial (Chauduri) or Mughal (Ashraf) ruling class have been steadily conceding political 
ground since independence. Whereas once the political class was dominated by these elites, the 
terrain has shifted at an accelerated rate, particularly since the restoration of democracy in 1991, 
which ushered in the era of economic liberalization. Currently, given politicians’ social 
backgrounds are secondary to their abilities as “leaders.” And ideal leaders are perceived most 
often as those who, through their wealth and popularity, are best able to provide “services” and 
“security” for their constituents, regardless of their socioeconomic background. 
Thus in terms of caste and status, while social background and hierarchical structures 
still shape “Mafia Raj” regimes, increasingly today’s strongmen have a diverse sociological 
background. We will show that this is a world where the personality of the bosses is becoming 
particularly important precisely because their power is often detached from hereditary status and 
patterns of local caste or community sovereignties. It follows that in our settings what becomes a 
source of conversation and admiration is often personal individual achievements rather than 
heritage. In the next sections of the article, we illustrate some of these dynamics at work by 
introducing readers to six political jugadis and enforcers at different stages of their careers. 
We start with the stories of Ahmed and Tufayl in Bangladesh and Ravi Kumar and Shiv 
Singh in North India. The Bangladeshi  aspiring bosses are in their mid-twenties, unemployed, 
and from wealthy Londoni families.7 Apart from their family’s wealth, the two do not have 
much going for them in the sphere of political (criminal) prowess. They lack education, personal 
charm, the ability to speak in public, and menace. The North Indian aspirants are in their mid-
twenties and thirties, too. The first is a party worker, but he describes himself as a youth leader. 
He is a sycophant of the local strongman and he aspires to go independent and to contest ward 
elections in two years, and to contest in the MLA elections in 2022, but he does not belong to 
the right caste and does not have the muscle to move up the career bosses’ ladder. The second is 
an aspiring political boss who is improvising an extortionist career by using the criminal 
credentials of the local political party. However, he does not have the “guts” to use violence and 
does not have the contacts (and membership) in the local oil mafia that would enable him to 
advance professionally in the local “Mafia Raj” system.  
In the process of relating these stories, we hope to be able to illustrate how their spirit of 
improvisation appeals (or not) to Bangladeshi and Indian followers, and how these seemingly 
lowly aspiring bosses manage, with varying degrees of success, to manipulate (particularly poor) 
locals into believing in their value. Finally, these accounts will be contrasted with two young 
self-made enforcers (dabang, mastan) in an effort to ethnographically draw out the role of 
enforcement (and jugad as criminal entrepreneurship) in shaping criminal political economies in 
South Asia. 
 
THE STORIES OF FOUR “JUGAADIS” 
Ahmed (Sylhet) 
The Union Parishad chairman lived next door to our homestead. Sometimes we would sit 
on the edge of the pond neighboring the chairman’s personal longhouse watching men from all 
over the union come in and out. A permanent feature of this landscape was Ahmed. In between 
loitering, minding the family goats grazing in the fields, and prayers, Ahmed engages in political 
campaigning. Without fail, Ahmed approaches every one of the chairman’s visitors and has a 
conversation with them. Observing from a distance, he tends to retain the attention of those from 
the lower castes. Higher social groups are inclined to ignore him and pass by or, especially 
younger (wealthy) men, tease and poke fun at him. On one occasion, we spoke to a fisherman 
who had just been to see the chairman and, as usual, Ahmed approached him on the way into the 
homestead. We asked the man why he had visited the chairman. It turned out that his roof had 
collapsed in the storms the previous night. It was customary among the village poor to seek 
community support in such circumstances, and the chairman was the first port of call. The 
chairman promised the man that he would do what he could to support him, and that he would 
ask various Londoni households in the area to contribute funds for the repair. We then asked 
what Ahmed spoke to him about. He told us that Ahmed tried to find out why he was visiting the 
chairman. When he discovered that it was because of a collapsed roof, Ahmed told the man that 
he had many friends who were in the construction business and that the situation would be 
solved within the week if the man so wished. He also said that the chairman was busy and did 
not have time to deal with petty requests. He claimed to have contacts in London who would 
send money for the repair. The man refused: “How can I wait that long, Baba? There will be no 
house in a week!” 
After speaking to a few of our interlocutors, we learned that Ahmed offered his 
“services” to villagers in the hope of being recognized as a canny operator and “fixer.” Some of 
the more unassuming ones would take up his offer, only to be ultimately disappointed. In 
actuality, he had no contacts and no money but relied on the chairman’s networks. Some poor 
villagers would assume that Ahmed is one of the chairman’s associates, given his social stature 
and proximity to the latter, and accept his advice. Ahmed would then approach the chairman 
himself and inform him of the issues raised by a given villager. The case would eventually be 
concluded, depending on its feasibility, but would take much longer than if the villagers actually 
went directly to the chairman. Most people in the village, however, know that Ahmed is a bluff 
artist and dismiss his advances.  
 
Tufayl 
Tufayl is a member of the richest lineage group (gushti) in the village. His paternal uncles 
(once removed) own a chain of successful Indian restaurants in the English Midlands. They 
regularly send remittances to their extended family in the village. Tufayl’s nuclear family, like 
Ahmed’s, receives a portion of the money that then subsidizes revenues generated from 
sharecropping. Despite these means of income, Tufayl’s immediate family is considerably less 
wealthy than the other households in the lineage group. His father has been ill for many years 
and hence unable to work. His oldest brother is a work visa over-stayer in the United Kingdom, 
and has not sent any money back for a few years. His other brother is in prison on murder 
charges. Tufayl is now the only male sibling in his home, and expectations for him to provide for 
his family are high. 
Unlike Ahmed, Tufayl went to secular school. Like Ahmed, he never quite matriculated. 
Tufayl has never secured a job either. He spends most of his days loitering around the center of 
the village—in the tea stalls, on the bridge, on the phone. He is into fashion. He wears the latest 
designs and has extremely ostentatious tastes. His favorite combination seems to be a bright pink 
and lime green checkered shirt with mustard corduroy trousers. He wears this combination as 
often as possible, including at panchayat meetings, village functions, and weddings. Tufayl is 
also into local politics and harbors ambitions of becoming a politician. As his lineage group is 
one of the most influential in the village, Tufayl has recognized an opportune shoe-in into the 
political scene. In addition, some of his cousins are prominent members of the mainstream 
political party’s youth wings in the union, which he feels adds to his credibility. But Tufayl is not 
a politician in any regard. He speaks too fast, is very short and very slender, and has a penchant 
for saying the wrong thing at the wrong time. 
Despite these obvious shortfalls, Tufayl has cultivated a reputation among impoverished, 
low-caste groups as someone to turn to when in need of “help” (shahajjo). 
 
AH: You always seem to be offering tea to Tufayl [at the stall], why? 
Villager: He is someone who can help us. His uncles are very rich. They always come 
from London with money to share. Maybe he can speak (sifarish) to them on my behalf. I 
have four young daughters and they are all unmarried. The tea stall is not enough. 
Weddings are expensive. 
AH: Do you know of anyone Tufayl has helped in the past? 
Villager: Last year when his eldest uncle came, they sacrificed fifty cows for the poor. I 
went to the madrasa to get my household’s share and found Tufayl there handing out 
portions. I asked him for some extra and he gave me two bags of biryani. My children 
were so pleased! He could only do that because he’s the nephew. Like that, if you stay 
close to him, he will help you. 
 
It is this optimism and sense of expectation among some of the villagers that Tufayl 
capitalizes upon. In this part of Bangladesh, being connected to a Londoni lineage group has the 
potential to provide many rewards. Those without Londoni links are by far the most 
socioeconomically desolate in the region (Gardner 1995). Londonis, when they return, are 
expected to be generous and altruistic with their money and resources. They provide a form of de 
facto welfare safety net for poor villagers. When Londonis cannot be contacted or approached 
directly, those of their relatives who are resident in Bangladesh are approached as intermediaries 
in the granting of donations. Moreover, over the past two decades, more and more Londoni 
lineage groups have entered formal politics as a means to manage their property and business 
interests in Bangladesh (Garbin 2002). As a consequence, many Londoni lineage groups have 
risen to powerful positions at union and sub-district levels. Some have even forged business links 
with high-ranking politicians at the national level. These developments do not go unnoticed. 
Villagers are acutely aware of the potential riches and influence that a Londoni patron can offer. 
And so is Tufayl. Even though his own family is struggling to survive, he is aware of the wider 
perceptions towards his lineage group, and he spends most of his time playing up to them. By far 
his most favorite public performance involves his mobile phone. Most afternoons, Tufayl can be 
found sitting on the side of the road that connects the paddy fields to the village center. As 
workers pass by on the way home from the fields, Tufayl can be heard engrossed in political 
discussions. These conversations are heavily laced with talk of “funds,” “donations,” and 
“projects.” Passers-by are clearly impressed. 
But, not everyone is impressed. Among the rich farming households, Tufayl is perceived 
to be a comedy character and, like Ahmed, not taken seriously at all—including by his own first 
cousin: 
 
Tufayl? He’s a fool. He spends all day speaking to a prostitute that he’s in love with and 
makes out he’s talking to the mayor of London! He wants to show all these ghulams 
[tenant group, lit. “slaves”] that he is the real deal and they obviously fall for it—for a 
while. Then, when push comes to shove, he doesn’t deliver anything. He shames himself 
and the rest of us. But they [the tenant group] still follow him around because they’re as 
shameless as him! He has nothing. No money, no power. But those workers think he 
holds the winning lottery ticket. That’s why they [the workers] are where they are. 
 
Tufayl has been loitering around the village since he left school ten years ago. In that 
time, he has not progressed along the political ladder. Tufayl cannot influence village decision-
making in any way. His only option, it seems, is to garner a following among the village 
subaltern groups in the hope of being of some assistance to the bigwigs during election time. He 
and Ahmed are not, however, the only unemployed village youth engaged in “timepass” in this 
way (Jeffrey 2010). Nor are they the only ones seeking a career in local politics. Ahmed and 
Tufayl are part of an entire generation of village youth who aspire to become politicians. Some, 
as we have seen, do not quite make the grade. Others go all the way to the top. 
 Ravi Kumar (western Uttar Pradesh) 
Ravi is thirty-three years old. He comes from a middle-class family. His father is a lower-
rank bureaucrat, and so is his brother. He used to work in a local computer shop as an assistant. 
He decided to drop his job when the Samajwadi Party (SP) rose to power in March 2012. Since 
then he has been one of the many “boys who are nobody but aspire to be somebody” who 
surround local powerful figures. People derogatorily call them “chamchas” (sycophants), but 
they call themselves “youth leaders.” As the secretary of the local MLA pointed out, “You will 
find no party workers here, they are all leaders!” Ravi started to dress up in the white kurta 
pyjama, which makes “politicians” stand out from the others (the common people) in any Uttar 
Pradesh provincial town. The “politician uniform” is hence an essential prop in any credible 
theatrics of power in this part of the world. Ravi said that he believed that a neta (a leader) 
should be notably dressed in order to have authority. We asked him why he does not wear dark 
shades like the other “chamchas” that surround Guddu Bhaia (his boss). He said that he is doing 
“sewa” not “goondagardi.” The dark glassed —he said is a signal—a dabang signal— and he 
also said that  Bhaia (and here he was referring to the CM Akhilesh Yadav) “had exhorted the SP 
youth not to wear them during the last election campaign. I am following his lead.” 
In front of Ravi’s house, there is a board with his name and the Samajwadi Party’s logo, 
and he arranged his front room to meet “the people.” However, he spends most of his time at the 
residence of his boss to assist with the darbar there and indeed mainly helps out by repairing the 
office computer. His main daily activities are to be seen close to authoritative people and to get 
to know them. He also needs to show courage, reliability, and devotion for his boss. Ravi is 
indeed very devoted to Gudduji (one of the local strongmen or dabang). He aspires to have his 
support in the next municipality elections: “I have it all planned. I am building up a database in 
which I inserted all the people who I met at Guddu Bhaia’s office and the people of my 
neighborhood who approached me for help. It is all in an Excel document. A database! When I 
reach 5,000 people I will show it to Guddu Bhaia. This will be a tangible proof of the support 
that I can bring to the party. This will pave the way for my career with the SP.” 
A couple of days after this conversation, we were speaking with Arjun Kumar (a well-
established businessman in his forties with companies in Delhi, Canada, and the United States). 
Arjun is indeed a very successful, local, self-made man. We were in the bazaar when Ravi 
approached. He touched Arjun’s feet very ceremoniously, pretending to give respect, but without 
really meaning it. It turned out that Arjun was Ravi’s former employer before he left the Uttar 
Pradesh provinces to set up his company in the United States five years previously. They 
exchanged greetings. With an air of importance, Ravi took out his business card with the SP logo 
and explained to Arjun that he was now one of the local secretaries of the party (there are about 
eighteen party secretaries in town). He added: “If you need any help, please do contact me.” He 
also told him very pompously that he was planning to contest the Lok Sabha elections in 2019! 
When he left, Arjun could not refrain from smiling. “Did you hear that? He is unemployed, and 
he tells me, his former boss, running a successful international business, that I may need him.… I 
wanted to tell him that he may need me.” 
On one occasion, I asked Guddu Bhaia (Ravi’s boss) about Ravi’s political career 
prospects. He looked at me, puzzled. “What do you mean, the computer boy?” He smiled. “He is 
a Kumar (traditional caste of potters). How many Kumars do we have in town and in the 
constituency? Maximum 6,000 people.… He does not stand a chance of getting a ticket in this 
part of the state. Plus, he is not strong (tej). No money. What kind of possibility of winning an 
election will he have? None!” He laughed again. “But he is a nice boy, devoted. And we need 
him for the computers….” 
 
Shiv Singh (western Uttar Pradesh) 
Shiv is twenty-seven years old. He is also one of the young men who keeps himself close 
to Guddu Bhaia and the local SP leadership. Unlike Ravi, he belongs to “the right caste”—he is a 
Thakur like his boss. Also unlike Ravi, he seems to be eager to be associated with the “goonda” 
(criminal) image of the political party. He wears dark shades, usually jeans, colorful and shiny t-
shirts, and big jewelry. He travels with a powerful motorbike, but he aspires to buy a Pajero—the 
big four-by-four car, which is currently very much in fashion among political leaders and 
dabangs in provincial Uttar Pradesh. He also plans to contest elections in 2022. He will be ready 
by then. He concedes, however, that he is conscious that in order to get power he needs money. 
His family is by no means wealthy. They have a few plots of land, nothing more. Also, they are 
not very supportive of his “career path” and his father thinks that he is just “time passing” and 
going around with the wrong people. But, along with some of his friends, he discovered that 
politics might indirectly provide him with some easy cash. Arjun and his friends (all Rajput men 
in their twenties) improvised careers as extortionists by cashing in on the “goonda” reputation of 
the Samajwadi Party, and its Rajput face, the famous mafia-don Raja Bhaia. They are not the 
only ones. In the district under study, a variety of people (from businessmen to unemployed 
people to aspirant leaders) associated themselves with the Samajwadi Party—which was 
popularly known as a “goonda [criminal] party and a reputable criminal enterprise”—and use 
this connection to start their careers as enforcers or in the business of protection. 
In many instances, the names of the SP and Raja Bhaia may indeed successfully function 
as tokens of protection and deterrents, as they communicate a certain reputation. As scholars of 
the mafia have elaborated, reputation is of key importance in the business of protection and 
enforcement. So what we witness is a multiplication of predatory centers of power, in 
competition with each other, which is producing a sense of chaos and anarchy in the town and 
state: a “Mafia Raj” (Martin and Michelutti 2017). In this environment, people are aware that 
they can be tricked. They no longer know whom they have to pay “to get things done” or to beat 
someone up. It is in this chaotic environment that Shiv and his crew tried to convert the violent 
reputation of the SP and their Rajput networks into money, although without much success. 
To elaborate, in early 2013, Shiv started to advertise his enforcement services to the 
shopkeepers and small businessmen of the local bazaar who are often also money lenders. As 
such, from time to time, they need muscle to recover loans or to get protected by local goons, 
who ask for money in return for their services. Arjun said that the business mainly involved 
intimidation. They did not use weapons and thought that they could just get away by enacting 
threats (dhamkhana). However, as soon as one of the clients rebelled, Shiv and his crew backed 
off and ran away. Their business lasted only a few months. In order to be effective, violent 
reputations need to be reconfirmed with real and visible acts of violence from time to time. Arjun 
and his friends did not have the capacity, the means, and most importantly, the willingness to do 
it. “I am not a criminal,” he said. 
Additionally, Shiv also engaged in money lending but had troubles in recovering his own 
loans. We discovered from two established enforcers from the local akhara (wrestling arena) that 
Arjun had asked them to recover one of his loans. As the story goes, Arjun needed to recover Rs 
50,000. His men, however, did not want to go to muscle up the “client” because the client’s wife 
was known to be a very smart lady. Going to their house may have meant that they could end up 
in jail with a fake rape charge. Furthermore, they found out that the cousin of “the smart lady” 
was a member of the local oil mafia: “Those people do not joke, they have pistols, [and] they kill 
you. They have full political protection.” Basically, Shiv realized that he did not have the 
contacts to get out of a potentially dangerous situation, and did not want to risk his life in trying 
to impose his will by violence. 
 
BECOMING AN ENFORCER (DABAG OR MASTAN): TWO STORIES 
Khaled (Sylhet) 
Khaled is in his mid-thirties; he is married with young children. After Khaled passed his 
SSC (high school) examinations, he decided to further his education. He attended a local college, 
where he first became involved in party politics. At college and university campuses in 
Bangladesh, students are attracted to political parties due to their ubiquity, and, more 
importantly, the “conveniences” (shubidah) they offer (Ruud 2010). At the time of his 
recruitment, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP—center-right) was the ruling party. 
Consequently, the student wing of the party, the Bangladeshi Jatiyatabadi Dal (BJD), was in a 
very powerful position on campus. Ruling party groups are offered subsidized quotas in 
residence halls, are given cash grants to organize student events, and are permitted to offer 
“protection” to surrounding businesses. The activists are mainly young men, who are often 
armed and potentially violent. Those students who decide to join the group are afforded 
“benefits” (bebosthan), such as free lodging, subsidized tuition fees, and personal protection. 
Khaled became an active member of the BJD while at college, organizing and participating in 
numerous street protests, strikes, and cross-party skirmishes. His enthusiasm and competence 
were promptly recognized by the BNP hierarchy, who promoted him to leadership positions 
within the BJD contingent at the college. His activism, however, had a disruptive effect on his 
studies, and Khaled duly failed his Higher Secondary Certificate examinations. Unable to 
progress to university, Khaled decided to return to the village and try his hand in business. Once 
back in the village, he remained politically active, competing for and succeeding in winning 
office as president of the union Jubo Dal (the youth wing of the BNP)—a position he still holds. 
Like Ahmed and Tufayl, Khaled also reaps financial rewards from transnational links. 
Khaled has utilized this flow of capital in various business ventures. He opened a bookshop in 
Goala Bazaar (a local bazaar town), and bought a minibus and people-carrier for private hire. He 
has used his money and political influence to forge a formidable reputation in the village; he is 
widely respected for his industry and intelligence, particularly among the elders. He is well-
spoken, respectful, and courteous, although slightly introverted, which succeeds in enhancing his 
enigmatic presence in public. His impressive resume, wealth, and noble characteristics have 
enhanced his standing in the public sphere, and recently resulted in him being appointed the 
youngest-ever president of the Government Primary School—a key position for would-be 
political careerists. Our informants are keen to point out that Khaled is not as squeaky clean as 
his public demeanor suggests, however: 
 
Khaled is a former classmate of mine, and I know him very well. He’s considered a “big 
cheese” (boro manush) in the village these days, because he has a lot of money. But his 
background is modest. People respect that. They respect people who’ve made money 
from nothing. He shows his money now—splashing it here and there—but also in the 
clothes that he wears, even the way he walks. He’s ambitious. He wants to go all the way 
to the top. At the top, the most money can be made. The biggest businessmen are the 
most senior politicians. That’s where he wants to get. People think his interests are in 
social development (somaj-sheba), and he’s done a very good job in convincing the 
elders of this. But I know that it’s all bithor-gian (self-centered). It’s about being in a 
position where you can take a “cut” on public funds. The higher the office, the bigger the 
funds. 
 
In addition to his many political talents, Khaled also possesses an aptitude for violence 
and intimidation. When agitated, his public speeches can be intense and austere, not shying away 
from verbal confrontation with opponents, and subtle threats of reprisal, when required. Khaled, 
however, is not an ostensible mastaan, insofar as he is not well built or athletic; he speaks in a 
refined manner and is always well groomed. Furthermore, even though he is the bona fide owner 
of firearms, he seldom displays them in public, or, like most mastaans, boasts of their existence. 
Instead, he exhibits them when necessary, most often when disputes become untenable. These 
attributes all combine to create a mysterious, charismatic, and highly pragmatic leader who is 
widely perceived and touted to reach the summit. 
In a similar fashion to Ahmed and Tufayl, Khaled also offers improvised “services” to 
the villagers. Unlike them, however, he actually can enforce their delivery. At his bookstore in 
Goala Bazaar and in his home, he holds office for villagers and members of his political party. 
They approach him for a variety of purposes, including arbitration, provision of loans, and 
official references. On occasion, he appropriates the use of force (actual or threatened), 
depending on the case, to deliver “services.” It is widely rumored that Khaled wants to compete 
in the next union elections as a candidate for chairman. His selection as chairman would 
constitute a radical shift in the history of union politics as well as in the wider region. 
Traditionally, union heads in Sylhet tend to originate from landed backgrounds. They are usually 
successful businessmen in some capacity or can boast of an established political career. 
In recent years, however, this pattern is being challenged by younger, savvy individuals 
who rise through the ranks of the two dominant political parties by demonstrating their acumen 
in business (both licit and illicit), organizing protection syndicates, and mustering a popular 
following at the local level. Elsewhere, we have argued that this type of leadership has its origins 
in the ever-burgeoning “muscularity” of student politics in the country—and the urban tactics 
that are synonymous with it—which is gradually managing to penetrate the country’s rural 
hinterland (Hoque 2014; cf. Ruud 2014). Given these national developments, it may be 
somewhat unwise to entirely dismiss the scope of Khaled’s ambition or, indeed, his potential 
appointment. 
Khaled, then, is the archetypical powerful, self-made man and enforcer-politician. 
Although he is as yet unelected, in his day-to-day life he displays all the attributes of “real 
power.” Thus far in his early career, he has successfully navigated the formative world of student 
politics, built up a business empire through criminal entrepreneurship, and ultimately entered the 
upper echelons of rural politics by exhibiting his skills in performing both sheba (social work) 
and mastani (criminal work) in an effective way. 
 
Akhilesh Chowdhery (western Uttar Pradesh) 
Akhilesh Chowdhery is in his early thirties like Khaled. He is a Jat, which is the 
dominant caste of the district. He used to be the chamcha of two of the most powerful old Jat 
leaders of the area, who groomed him to be the new muscular face of their regional caste party, 
the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), which is known to be the Jats’ party in western Uttar Pradesh. 
Akhilesh was eventually elected president of the Zila Parishad. 
Akhilesh’s father is a simple village sarpanch and a farmer. He got money by being close 
to the right centers of power and for his willingness to be a member (and now a leader) in local 
mafia criminal enterprises. Like Khaled, Akhilesh does not have a muscular physique. He does 
not look like the “typical” strong, tall Jat young man. On the contrary, he is fairly short and thin, 
but he possesses a natural authority. He is highly feared by his entourage and by the people 
working at the District Magistrate (DM) office. The DM is under the scrutiny of the Zila 
Parishad. Akhilesh told us in a very cocky voice: “The DM is my secretary and I can transfer 
him when I want.” Even if quite young, Akhilesh has already acquired a reputation for being 
“cruel” and “ruthless.” He does indeed inspire more fear than love. 
The following description is about how Akilesh got elected president of the Zila Parishad 
at such a young age. This conversation helps us to understand what getting power at high levels 
means in this part of the world. Here is how a prominent local caste leader (teacher, sixty-two 
years old) narrated the story to us: 
 
These are “public secrets” [he used exactly these words in English]. I can tell you all 
about it. The previous president (X) was elected Zila Parishad president in 2011. He is 
also a young Jat, a muscular dabang type of leader. The majority of members who elect 
the Zila Parishad are Jats. It was then a question of getting the right number of votes and 
building support across Jat factions or clans. At that time, there was a tussle between the 
local MP (from RLD) (Y) and the state minister for Rural Development (both very 
important Jat leaders) (Z). 
The local MP (Y) supported X. Since the Bahujan Samaj Party was in government, many 
Jat clans supported him. (RLD and BSP had an alliance.) Y’s faction had the support of 
sixteen Zila Parishad members. They were sent to Goa for two weeks before the election 
to avoid the fact that Z intimidated or bribed them. Z was also supported by sixteen Zila 
Parishad members. He kept them secure (i.e., kidnapped) in a guesthouse. 
Five members were however not aligned, and both parties fought for them. Both parties 
wanted the vote of these five members in order to win the election. Meanwhile RLD 
people came to know that one of the members (G.R.) took 80 lakhs from Z to vote for the 
other faction. He actually was in Goa but his wife took money from Z. The local MP (Y) 
came to know about this deal and he moved all his “supporters” from Goa to Nepal (his 
father at the time was the Aviation Minister). 
All members came back to town only the day before election. Meanwhile, Z came to 
know that G.R. had also taken money from RLD and that he was voting for RLD. The 
night before the election Z went to G.R.’s house and beat him up. He destroyed the 
interior of his house and took his money back. He is still in very bad shape. He is not able 
to walk without a stick. Go to see him and you will see it with your own eyes. So X got 
elected as president. After one year the SP government came into power and, of course, 
they wanted to have an SP president. So the SP started giving money to members to sign 
a “no confidence” motion. 
Finally, some members signed the “no confidence” motion paper. X had to resign from 
the president post. A committee was formed to run the transition for six months. During 
these six months a war sparked between the SP and RLD for the president post. RLD 
decided that they needed a candidate with money and muscle: a dabang. They got on 
board Akhilesh Chowdhery. A very young man (early thirties) who allegedly made a lot 
of money by running the local oil mafia. He is a proper dabang. He also has good 
relations with Z and other important old leaders (all allegedly involved in the oil mafia). 
So he was a suitable candidate for the president’s post. He managed to get a good number 
of votes and finally got selected as a president. He had to give lots of money to the 
members in order to get voted…. 
 
The “public secret” stopped being so public when we pushed and tried to have more 
information about the “oil mafia.” We could sense that suddenly a more dangerous terrain was 
touched. “It is best to stay out of it,” he suggested. The oil mafia is said to have grown 
phenomenally over the past thirty years. It has been documented that one thousand liters of oil 
are stolen yearly. Oil is siphoned off from the main pipeline of India Oil Corporation, which runs 
from Gujarat to Uttar Pradesh via Rajasthan. Crude oil is stolen from the pipes, adulterated, and 
sold to both black and official markets (Michelutti et al., forthcoming). Oil syndicates involve 
the organization of a variety of players: tankers, ration shop owners, civil supplies department 
officials, the police, and, crucially, politicians. Without political protection, the oil mafia does 
not exist. Brutal killings of Indian Oil Corporation officers and of government officers have 
made clear to the locals that the “oil rackets” make “offers that cannot be refused.”8 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this article we show how a great deal of young men (and seldom women) improvise 
political and “criminal” careers in this part of the world. Our stories show that to become the 
chamcha of a boss, and to be recognized as part of his or her entourage, is often the first career 
step aspiring bosses take. This involves being seen at politicians’ darbars, the panchayat or 
municipalities meetings, at political rallies, at inaugurations, at weddings, and of course in 
election campaigns and on Election Day itself. People need to know that one is close to power 
and able to gain and cultivate it. One has to also stage authority in a variety of ways. For 
example, looking busy is crucial. This often means being seen with a mobile phone attached to 
one’s ear for long periods—in order to create the effect of busyness (besto manush) and 
importance (dorkari manush). Thirdly, one must make efforts to get to know as many local 
people as possible in order to garner a reputation as a concerned servant of the community and a 
“good person” (balo manoush, sajjan). Finally, one increasingly needs the muscle (or the 
credibility that one can use muscle) to enforce. Once people have noticed the young jugaadi, he 
or she must be in a position to offer or impose “services” (sheba, sewa) and protection to the 
people. It is at this final hurdle that many aspiring bosses fall, but not for want of trying. In the 
end, only a few “jugaadis” manage to climb the ladder within the local systems of Mafia Raj. In 
order to advance, they need to acquire and cultivate enforcement skills. These skills are not easy 
to bluff and improvise. They are not acquired at darbars or at political parties’ conventions, but 
mainly by engaging with criminal entrepreneurship. Ultimately, our stories show qualitatively 
different forms of jugaad. On the one hand, we have jugaad as a way of getting by, and on the 
other we have jugaad as a criminal prerequisite to achieve self-determination and dominance. As 
Pine (2012, 10) has marvelously captured in his study on Naples: “The art of making do is a 
speculative performance, the staging of a better life. Enacting it requires creative tactics for 
seizing opportunities and negotiating risks. Excessive speculation however can lead to violent 
determinations: the ad hoc art of making do has the potential to transmogrify into organized 
crime.” 
If in Naples the figure of the self-realized sovereign is ultimately incarnated in the figure 
of a camorrista (a clan affiliate), in western Uttar Pradesh and Sylhet the self-realized sovereign 
is incarnated in the figures of the mastan and dabang who belong to organized systems of 
criminal entrepreneurship. In both settings, organized systems of crime work through contacts 
that perpetually rope in young men to work for companies or groups linked to local party 
machines (Hoque 2014; Martin and Michelutti 2017). The successful dabang or mastan carves 
out for himself or herself monopolies over coercion and businesses in particular territories.  
These systems are not static or by any means centrally and hierarchically organized. They 
are fluctuating systems, highly volatile and in perpetual transformation. However, this does not 
mean that they should be considered just disorganized and episodic acts of sovereignty. This 
approach would underestimate the organized systems of criminality and systems of “democratic” 
domination, which dabang and mastan performances produce, reproduce, and sustain (see 
Michelutti et al., forthcoming). It should be emphasized that organized mafia types of 
goondagardi are essentially directed to obtain profit. Goondagardi is not a social service that 
operates for the benefit of all (the entire population in one territory or also particular castes or 
communities), but rather a “service” that often acts against society as a whole for the benefit of 
the few. In spite of this, it is a world that cannot be painted with monochrome terms such as 
victims, villains, or heroes. It is a world in which it is difficult to establish who is the victim and 
who is the perpetrator. It is a world in which individuals can engage in both dominant and 
subaltern practices at the same time. These are also systems that live in perfect “symbiosis with a 
myriad of protectors, accomplices, debtors of all kinds, informers, and people from all strata of 
society, who have been paid, bribed, intimidated or blackmail” (Falcone and Padovani 1993, 81). 
This is the terrain where criminal political entrepreneurship grows and, once established, is often 
“retrospectively” accepted by the community and, crucially, receives formal democratic 
legitimatization. 
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